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I. INTRODUCTION
As the United States trade deficit hits record levels' and international
trade issues gain new political prominence,2 the executive and legislative
branches have renewed their long-running battle for control over United
States trade policy.' Currently at the center of that battle is a struggle for
control of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974," which gives the President
discretionary authority to impose retaliatory measures against any foreign
1. At the end of 1985, the United States became a net debtor for the first time since before World
War 1. 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 872 (July 2, 1986). The United States trade deficit reached an
annual rate of $168 billion in the first six months of 1986, compared with $148.5 billion in 1985.
Office of Trade & Investment Analysis, Int'l Trade Admin., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Trade
Outlook, Bus. AM., Aug. 18, 1986, at 3.
2. Seven hundred eighty two trade bills and resolutions were pending before the 99th Congress at
the end of June 1986. According to one study, 248 of these contained explicit protectionist provisions,
while one out of every four proposed trade restrictions for political rather than economic purposes.
Only 184 were aimed at liberalizing trade. See 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1047 (Aug. 13, 1986); see
also 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 69-77 (Jan. 8, 1986) (describing major trade bills pending before
Congress). Trade legislation continues to be a top priority with the 100th Congress. See Democrats
Make Passage of Trade Bill This Year Top Priority, Floor Votes Seen in Spring, 4 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 49 (Jan. 14, 1987); Bentsen To Make Omnibus Trade Bill High Priority in 1987, Tough
Measures Expected, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1359 (Nov. 12, 1986).
3. While the Constitution grants Congress the power to "regulate commerce with foreign Na-
tions," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the Supreme Court has held that the President possesses certain
inherent powers over the conduct of foreign relations. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). This ambiguous distribution of power has led to the same struggle
over foreign economic affairs that exists over foreign affairs generally. See generally L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37-65 (1972); F. WILCOX, CONGRESS, THE EXECU-
TIVE, AND FOREIGN POLICY (1971); Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policy-
making After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 INT'L LAW & POL. 1191 (1986).
4. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) provides:
If the President determines that action by the United States is appropriate -
(1) to enforce the rights of the United States under any trade agreement; or
(2) to respond to any act, policy, or practice of a foreign country or instrumentality that -
(A) is inconsistent with the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States
under, any trade agreement, or
(B) is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States
commerce;
the President shall take all appropriate and feasible action within his power to enforce such
rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, or practice. Action under this section
may be taken on a nondiscriminatory basis or solely against the products or services of the
foreign country or instrumentality involved.
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governmental act, policy, or practice5 that "burdens or restricts United
States commerce" and either violates international obligations or is deter-
mined by the President to be "unjustifiable, unreasonable, or
discriminatory."'
Section 301 is unusual not only because of the broad powers it confers
upon the President,7 but also because it gives private individuals a statu-
tory right to petition the government to espouse their claims in the inter-
national arena.' While section 301 has not been used aggressively in the
past,' a renewed surge of activity under the statute10 has heightened its
5. The terms "act," "policy" and "practice" refer to three different categories of governmental
action, but will be used interchangeably in the text of this Note.
6. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) authorizes the President to:
(1) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, or refrain from proclaiming, benefits
of trade agreement concessions to carry out a trade agreement with the foreign country or
instrumentality involved; and
(2) impose duties or other import restrictions on the products of, and fees or restrictions on
the services of, such foreign country or instrumentality for such time as he determines
appropriate.
Section 301 also reaches farther than other United States trade laws: (1) Section 301 can be used
against foreign government practices that harm U.S. exporters in third country markets; (2) Section
301 deals with a greater array of trade-distorting commercial policies, including those affecting ser-
vices and investment; (3) Section 301's requirement that foreign government practices "burden[] or
restrict[]" United States commerce is much lower than the "material injury" requirement of other
United States trade laws; and (4) Section 301 gives the President a broader choice of remedies than
other trade laws. See infra notes 63-64.
8. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) provides that:
Any interested person may file a petition with the United States Trade Representative
(U.S.T.R.) ...requesting the President to take action under section 2411 of this title and
setting forth the allegations in support of the request. The Trade Representative shall review
the allegations in the petition and, not later than 45 days after the date on which he received
the petition, shall determine whether to initiate an investigation.
9. Although § 301 gives the President sweeping powers to use at his discretion, it has been used
far less than other United States laws dealing with unfair foreign trade practices. During 1984, for
example, three petitions for action under § 301 were filed with U.S.T.R. compared with 126 petitions
filed with the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission under the an-
tidumping and countervailing duty laws. See Hearings on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (statement of Allan I.
Mendelowitz, Senior Assoc. Dir., Nat'l Sec. and Int'l Aff. Div., U.S. Gen. Accounting Off.) [hereinaf-
ter Hearings]. Less than fifty § 301 investigations were initiated during 1974-1985, while more than
500 antidumping and countervailing petitions were filed during 1980-1985. See Holmer & Bello, A
Remedy to Unfair Trade Practices Gets Results, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 22, 1986, at 24.
Of the 58 § 301 investigations that have been undertaken since 1975, only 27 have been terminated
or suspended pursuant to bilateral agreements or satisfactory foreign response. See OFFICE OF U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SEcrION 301 TABLE OF CASES (Feb. 1987) (available from U.S.T.R.)
[hereinafter SECrION 301 TABLE]. Four petitions were withdrawn by petitioners; three resulted in
negative determinations, see infra note 36; seven were dropped in favor of action under other U.S.
trade laws. SECTION 301 TABLE, supra. Eleven investigations are still involved in international dis-
pute settlement proceedings (including one case which has been pending since 1975), and three cases
remain part of continuing bilateral negotiations. Id. Only three investigations have actually resulted in
retaliatory action by the United States:
(1) Canada Border Broadcasting, 43 Fed. Reg. 39,610 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep. 1978) (initiation), 45
Fed. Reg. 51,173 (1980) (presidential determination) (President proposed legislation to mirror Can-
ada's "unreasonable" practice of denying tax deductions to Canadian taxpayers for advertising time
purchas-.d from United States broadcast stations but directed at Canadian market; enacted by Trade
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political importance. The statute has also attracted attention because of
President Reagan's unprecedented decision in September 1985 to begin
initiating section 301 investigations on his own motion rather than waiting
for a private petitioner to trigger action under the statute.1
and Tariff Act of 1984, § 232, Pub. L. No. 98-573);
(2) EC Citrus Tariff Preferences, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,567 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep. 1976) (initiation), 50
Fed. Reg. 26,143 (1985) (presidential determination), 50 Fed. Reg. 26,143 (1985) (presidential ac-
tior), 51 Fed. Reg. 30,146 (1985) (termination) (President imposed substantially increased duties on
European Community (EC) pasta products in response to EC preferential tariffs on citrus products
from certain Mediterranean countries; EC reacted by raising duties on lemons and walnuts imported
from United States; after month of negotiations, retaliatory duties were terminated pursuant to bilat-
eral agreement). See also EC Pasta Export Subsidies, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,675 (1981) (initiation) (alleg-
ing that EC pasta export subsidies violate international trade agreements);
(3) Argentina Hides, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,353 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep. 1981) (initiation), 47 Fed. Reg.
49,625 (1982) (presidential determination), 47 Fed. Reg. 52,989 (1982) (termination) (President ter-
minated United States-Argentina hides agreement and increased United States tariff on leather im-
ports in response to Argentine hide export controls that allegedly violated that agreement).
10. Ten § 301 investigations have been initiated since September 1985, compared to two in the
previous year. See SECTION 301 TABLE, supra note 9. The Administration has also been more aggres-
sive about resolving § 301 cases: Since September 7, 1986, U.S.T.R. has reached settlements in three
investigations. See EC Canned Fruit Production Subsidies, SECTION 301 TABLE, supra note 9, at 13;
Japan Non-Rubber Footwear Import Restrictions, 51 Fed. Reg. 9,435 (1985); Japan Semiconductors,
51 Fed. Reg. 27,811 (1986) (discussed infra Section IV.C.). The United States has also settled all but
one of the eight cases it has "self-initiated" since September 1985, see infra note 11, and reached a
negotiated settlement of the Japan Semiconductor petition. See Japan-United States: Agreement on
Semi-Conductor Trade, 26 I.L.M. 1409 (1986). See generally OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REPORT TO CONGRESS REQUIRED BY SECTION 306 OF THE TRADE ACT
OF 1974 (Jan.-June 1986) [hereinafter SECTION 306 REPORT]; Holmer & Bello, supra note 9.
11. A decision to initiate a § 301 "investigation" triggers a process of domestic consultation and
international negotiation. See infra note 40. The President is also authorized to take immediate retali-
atory action without such an "investigation." See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Investigations under § 301 may be initiated either upon the President's own motion or upon the
petition of a private party. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(c)(1)-(2), 2412 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See infra
Section II.B. Until September 1985, all investigations were initiated pursuant to petitions by private
parties, usually trade associations and labor groups. See SECTION 301 TABLE, supra note 9. On
September 7, 1985, however, the President announced that he would direct U.S.T.R. to initiate three
§ 301 investigations: an investigation of South Korean laws that block competition from American fire
and life insurance companies, see Korea Insurance, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (1985) (initiation), 51 Fed.
Reg. 29,443 (1986) (terminating investigation following agreement to allow United States firms to
underwrite both life and non-life insurance in Korea), an investigation of Brazilian restrictions on
United States exports of computers, see Brazil Informatics, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,608 (1985) (initiation), 51
Fed. Reg. 35,993 (1986) (determining Brazilian practices unreasonable and directing U.S.T.R. to
suspend tariff concessions to Brazil when appropriate), 52 Fed. Reg. 1619 (1987) (suspending investi-
gation of Brazil's informatics policy and import restrictions, extending negotiations on intellectual
property protection and investment restrictions); and an investigation of allegedly prohibitive Japanese
tariffs on American tobacco products, see Japan Tobacco, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (1985) (initiation), 51
Fed. Reg. 35,995 (termination pending implementation of Japanese agreement to reduce its cigarette
tariff to zero and terminate discriminatory distribution pratices). See also Korea Intellectual Property,
50 Fed. Reg. 45,883 (1985) (initiation), 51 Fed. Reg. 29,445 (1986) (terminating investigation follow-
ing agreement to improve protection of intellectual property rights in South Korea) (discussed infra
Section IV.C.); EC Enlargement, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,294 (1986) (initiation) (terminated after EC agreed
to compensate United States for losses resulting from agricultural restrictions imposed after Portugal
and Spain acceded to EC); Taiwan Customs Valuation, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,219 (1986), 51 Fed. Reg.
37,527 (1986) (terminated after Taiwan abolished its duty paying system); Taiwan Beer, Wine &
Tobacco, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,639 (1986) (initiation), 51 Fed. Reg. 44,958 (1986) (terminated after Tai-
wan ceased challenged distribution practices); Canada Softwood Lumber, 52 Fed. Reg. 229 (1987)
(imposing temporary duty on imports of Canadian lumber products), 52 Fed. Reg. 1311 (1987) (ter-
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Despite the Reagan Administration's increased use of section 301, a
persistent belief that the executive branch should be making even greater
use of the economic leverage provided by the statute 2 has led both the
House and the Senate to consider new legislation to reduce Presidential
discretion under the statute."3 These new bills include proposals to give
private petitioners greater control over the resolution of their cases;1 to
make initiation of section 301 investigations mandatory under specified
circumstances;1 5 to set tighter deadlines for decisions regarding initiation
minated after Canada implemented provisions of earlier agreement). See generally SEcrION 301 TA-
BLE, supra note 9.
12. See Yeutter Asserts Proposed Changes in Section 301 Are Unnecessary, Would Harm U.S.
Interests, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 940 (July 23, 1986) (citing comments by various Senators that
legislation is necessary to ensure Administration will use statute more agressively); see also Dingell
Asserts Reaction to Trade Problems by Administration Is "Naive," "Indifferent," 3 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1198 (Oct. 1, 1986).
13. In January, 1987, Congressman Richard Gephardt reintroduced the House "Omnibus
Trade" bill (Trade & International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1986), H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987) (originally passed as H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)). Sections 112-119 of H.R.
3 contain amendments to § 301. Id. In February, 1985, Senator Bentsen introduced the Senate "Om-
nibus Trade" bill, S. 490, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S1851-79 (1987). Sections
301-305 of S. 490 contain amendments to § 301. Id. at S1863-65; see also S. 1862, incorporated as
Title II of S. 1860, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S15987-88 (1985) (prior Senate attempt to
amend section 301). In addition, President Reagan is planning to send a new trade bill to Congress in
early 1987. See Pine, Reagan To Seek New Power To Retaliate Against Curbs to Overseas Market
Access, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1987, at 3 col. 2.
14. Section 5(b) of S. 1862 would have required that an affirmative finding of violation be fol-
lowed by retaliation unless a settlement is reached that is acceptable to the petitioner and/or the
domestic industry. See 131 CONG. REc. 815988 (1985). This provision is repeated in § 301 of S. 490;
however, S. 490 would also allow the President to avoid retaliation by certifying that it would not be
in the national economic interest. See 132 CONG. REc. 81864 (1987).
15. Section 303 of S. 490 would require U.S.T.R. to initiate § 301 cases against practices identi-
fied in its annual report on trade barriers that are (a) likely to be found to violate § 301, and (b)
constitute a significant barrier to, or distortion of, trade. U.S.T.R. would be required to take into
account the potential increase in United States exports were the unfair practice eliminated, the extent
to which elimination of the practice would establish a precedent that is beneficial to United States
exports generally, and whether initiation of an investigation would be detrimental to other efforts
being made to eliminate such practices. See 132 CONG. REc. S1863-64 (1987). In addition, § 302 of
S. 490 would require U.S.T.R. to initiate investigations of practices that are found to be part of a
"consistent pattern" of market-distorting practices by a foreign government. Id. at S1863.
Section 115 of H.R. 3 would require initiation of an investigation when (a) consultation with
affected domestic interests indicates that § 301 proceedings will likely result in expanded export op-
portunities, (b) other United States exports would not suffer, and (c) self-initiation is in the United
States' economic interest. Section 112 would require self-initiation under the same conditions as in
§ 115. In addition, § 119 of H.R. 3 would require the President to achieve a reduction of at least
10% per year in the trade surpluses of countries that maintain both large surpluses with the United
States and a pattern of unfair trade practices. See H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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and retaliation;16 and to expand the statute's illustrative list of "unreason-
able" practices.
17
This Note criticizes each of these proposals, and argues that legislative
attempts to make section 301 more effective must be based on a clear un-
derstanding of the complex right that the statute was intended to establish.
Section II analyzes that right, and concludes that the statute requires a
careful balancing of economic, legal, and political considerations. Section
III criticizes recent legislative attempts to reduce presidential discretion,
and argues that Congress should instead restructure the President's dis-
cretion in light of the statute's underlying economic, legal, and political
goals."8 In order to ensure that executive action under section 301 is con-
sistent with these goals, Section IV proposes that Congress amend section
301 to incorporate emerging international legal notions of unreasonable-
ness in international trade. 9
16. Section 304 of S. 490 would require a decision on unfairness within nine months of initiation,
and mandatory retaliation within fifteen months of an affirmative determination, provided no settle-
ment is reached. See 131 CONG. REC. S15988 (1985). The President could postpone action for 60
days beyond this deadline if he certifies to Congress that progress is being made toward eliminating
the challenged practice, and could avoid retaliation entirely by certifying that retaliation would not be
in the national economic interest. Id. President Reagan's trade bill is expected to include a proposal
for a two-year limit on negotiations to settle trade disputes. See Pine, supra note 13.
17. Section 4 of S. 1862 explicitly expands § 301's list of "unreasonable" practices to include
industrial targeting, restrictions on technology transfer, toleration of cartels, discriminatory govern-
ment procurement, and export performance requirements. See 132 CONG. REc. S1865 (1987). Sec-
tions 112 and 113 of H.R. 3 expand "unreasonable" practices to include industrial targeting, denial of
internationally recognized worker rights, and toleration of cartels. See H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987). President Reagan's trade bill is expected to cite failure to grant "reciprocal" trade access as a
ground for retaliation. See Pine, supra note 13.
18. Congressional efforts to structure presidential discretion under § 301 are reflected in two ma-
jor amendments of the statute since 1974: Title IX of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (creating new Presidential authority to use section 301 to enforce United
States rights under trade agreements and to respond to government practices that are inconsistent with
trade agreement obligations; requiring use of trade agreement dispute settlement in trade agreement
cases; changing definition of "commerce" to include all United States services explicitly; and giving
President discretion to decide to retaliate against all United States trading partners on nondiscrimina-
tory basis or solely against products or services of country engaging in unfair practice) and the Trade
and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984) (adding procedural refinements;
clarifying standards for action under § 301; and pronouncing Congressional intent that § 301 be used
to deal with "new" trade issues such as investment barriers and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights). See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(3)-(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Section 301 is the most recent in a series of expansions of Presidential authority to retaliate against
discriminatory foreign trade policies that unduly burden United States commerce. See J. JACKSON,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 839-41 (1977); Fisher & Steinhardt,
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Protection for U.S. Exporters of Goods, Services, and Capital,
14 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 569, 573-74 & nn.14-20 (1982). Section 301 was derived from
section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 1882 (1962), but expanded Presiden-
tial authority beyond cases involving United States agricultural exports to all cases affecting United
States "commerce." It also introduced a new administrative process by which the private sector could
petition the U.S.T.R. to investigate complaints of unfair practices. See infra notes 32-36 and accom-
panying text.
19. This Note will focus on § 301's provision against "unreasonable" foreign government prac-
tices, because this provision offers both the greatest potential for eliminating unfair trade barriers and
the greatest need for statutory definition. See infra Section III.B.1.
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II. THE RIGHT ESTABLISHED BY SECTION 301
A. Economic, Legal, and Political Elements
Section 301 was intended to provide the President with "negotiating
leverage" to "insure fair and equitable conditions for United States com-
merce" and "to eliminate [trade] barriers . . . and . . . distortions . . . on
a reciprocal basis." 20 At bottom, the right protected by section 301 is thus
the nation's right to take political action in pursuit of national economic
interests, by negotiating international agreements that will enforce and ex-
pand the current international legal framework governing international
trade.2' The statute's principal provisions authorize the President to nego-
tiate bilateral agreements with foreign governments to reduce trade barri-
ers.22 The power to take retaliatory action was granted only in order in
increase the President's negotiating power.23
Section 301 pursues domestic economic goals, but respects international
legal and political restraints. Congress provided the President with eco-
nomic leverage in order to reduce' trade barriers and to advance the eco-
nomic interests of the United States as an exporting nation. 24 But the stat-
ute also explicitly recognizes that the United States must pursue its
economic goals in a way that takes account of the current international
legal framework governing international trade.2 5 Of the statute's four cat-
egories of violations,26 two are aimed at the enforcement of the nation's
20. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 164, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 7186, 7302 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1298].
21. Section 301 enforces the international legal framework by challenging practices that are deter-
mined to be inconsistent with existing trade agreements. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)-(2)(A). Section
301 expands the international framework by triggering negotiation of new bilateral agreements in
areas where no multilateral legal agreement has yet been reached. See infra note 29 and accompany-
ing text.
22. For a general discussion of the limits on presidential authority to negotiate international agree-
ments, see Koh, supra note 3, at 1195 n.13.
23. See S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 20, at 7302-03 (credible threat needed to give President
negotiating leverage).
24. Section 301 is flexible enough to provide import relief, but was primarily designed to promote
United States exports. The primary purposes of § 301 are:
(1) to foster the economic growth of, and full employment in, the United States by expanding
competitive United States exports through the achievement of commercial opportunities in for-
eign markets substantially equivalent to those accorded by the United States;
(2) to improve the ability of the President -
(A) to identify and to analyze barriers to (and restrictions on) United States trade and invest-
ment, and
(B) to achieve the elimination of such barriers and restrictions. ...
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 302, 98 Stat. 2948, 3000-01 (1984).
25. See FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1306 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (Congress presumed to avoid conflict with international law unless plain intention appears to
contrary).
26. Substantive violations of § 301 are divided into four categories. Action may be taken under
§ 301 against practices that are (1) contrary to international agreements; (2) unjustifiable; (3) unrea-
sonable; or (4) discriminatory. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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rights under existing international agreements,27 while a third involves
well understood international legal concepts.2" The fourth category, aimed
at "unreasonable" foreign practices, was included in order to authorize
the negotiation of new agreements that establish new international legal
norms in areas of emerging importance to the United States economy.29
The statute's underlying threat of unilateral action by the United States
government also makes political considerations extremely important. On
the international level, the United States must recognize that foreign prac-
tices and policies reflect delicate political balances that a foreign govern-
ment may be unable or unwilling to disturb. On a domestic level, the
United States government must respond to its own set of political pres-
sures from Congress, labor unions, and United States industry. In recog-
nition of the need to accomodate these political realities, Congress granted
the President broad discretion to consider political factors when deciding
what action is "appropriate and feasible" to pursue statutory goals.30 In
order to enhance presidential discretion, the statute provides no congres-
sional or judicial review of presidential decisions under the statute; the
President is free to sacrifice the private interests at stake in an investiga-
tion in order to pursue national political, economic, or legal goals."1
B. The Right of Private Petition
Section 301 authorizes the President to take action on his own initia-
tive32 or upon the request of a petition filed by "any interested party"
with the United States Trade Representative (U.S.T.R.).3 3 Unlike private
27. The most frequently cited basis for a § 301 investigation, involving foreign acts, practices and
policies that are "inconsistent with" or "den[y] benefits to the United States under" any trade agree-
ment, depends entirely on the provisions of the relevant international agreement. See 19 U.S.C. §
2411(a)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). "Unjustifiable" is defined as "any act, policy or practice
which is in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the United States," 19
U.S.C. § 2411(e)(4) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), and refers primarily to agreements that provide for
national or most-favored-nation treatment (such as treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion), the right of establishment, or protection of international property rights. Id.
28. The term "discriminatory" is defined as including "where appropriate, any act, policy, or
practice which denies national or most-favored-nation treatment to United States goods, services or
investment." See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
29. Section 302 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 states that the statute's purposes include
encouraging "the expansion of. . . international trade in services through the negotiation of agree-
ments. . . which reduce or eliminate barriers to international trade in services," and enhancing "the
free flow of foreign direct investment through the negotiation of agreements . . . which reduce or
eliminate the trade distortive effects of certain investment-related measures." See Trade and Tariff Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 302, 98 Stat. 2948, 3000-01 (emphases added). The role of the
unreasonableness provision is discussed infra, Section III.B.1.
30. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
31. See S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 20.
32. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. I1 1985).
33. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(c)(2), 2412 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Office of the United States
Trade Representative (U.S.T.R.) was established within the Executive Office of the President by 19
U.S.C. § 2171 (1982). The head of the Office (the U.S.T.R.) is appointed by the President, by and
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rights of action under other statutes,3 4 however, section 301's right of peti-
tion does not provide a separate enforcement mechanism. The right of
private petition is merely a subsidiary legal mechanism designed to en-
hance the executive branch's information regarding the nation's actual ec-
onomic problems. Rather than providing a private right of action, section
301 merely provides an administrative procedure by which private parties
can petition the United States government to act on their behalf.
Section 301's provisions for private petitions were included "in order to
. . . expedite the process by which burdensome foreign restrictions can be
brought to the attention of . . . the United States Government." 5 Given
the economic, legal, and political considerations that underlie section 301,
a private petitioner can thus claim little more than the right to present its
case before U.S.T.R.; to have the government determine whether his com-
plaint is in the national interest; and to give information and advice re-
garding any international negotiations resulting from his petition. 6
III. THE NEED FOR STRUCTURED PRESIDENTIAL DISCRETION
A. The Case for Discretion
1. Private Petitions
The broad national economic and foreign policy interests at stake in
section 301 investigations suggest that recent proposals to give private par-
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and is removable at the pleasure of the President. Id. The
U.S.T.R. holds the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and is the chief represen-
tative of the United States for all trade negotiations authorized by Congress, including those author-
ized by § 301. Id. He reports directly to the President and to Congress, advises the President and
Congress on trade-related matters, and chairs the interagency trade policy committee. Id.
An "interested party" must have a "significant interest," and includes "a producer of a like or
directly competitive product or a commercial importer or exporter of an [affected) product . . . or any
person representing a significant economic interest affected by the practice complained of in the peti-
tion." 15 C.F.R. 12006.0(b) (1986). No § 301 petition has yet been rejected on grounds of inadequate
interest. See Archibald, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, in MANUAL FOR THE PRACTICE OF
INTERNAIoNAI. LAw 4 (W. Ince & L. Glick, eds. 1984).
34. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982).
35. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 20, at 7305.
36. If U.S.T.R. decides not to initiate an investigation, it is currently required only to provide the
petitioner (and the public) with a written notice of its determination and the reasons behind it; peti-
tioners have no right of appeal. See 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (a)(2)-(b)(l) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In most
cases, however, petitioners choose to withdraw in order to avoid a negative determination. See SEC-
TION 306 REPORT, supra note 10 (semi-annual report describing petitions that have been withdrawn
or rejected in past six months); SETION 301 TABLE, supra note 9 (listing only three negative deter-
minations: EC and Japan Diversion of Steel to U.S., 41 Fed. Reg. 45,628 (1976) (initiation), 43 Fed.
Reg. 3952 (1978) (termination) (due to "insufficient justification for claim that EC-Japan agreement
created unfair burden on U.S.); Taiwan Non-Rubber Footwear Import Restrictions, 47 Fed. Reg.
56,428 (1982) (initiation), 48 Fed. Reg. 58,561 (1983) (presidential determination) (finding Taiwan
does not impose unfair barriers on U.S. imports); and European Space Agency Satellite Launching
Services, 49 Fed. Reg. 28,643 (1984) (initiation), 50 Fed. Reg. 29,631 (1984) (termination) (finding
ESA's practices not unreasonable)).
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ties greater control over the resolution of investigations initiated pursuant
to their petitions3 7 are fundamentally misguided. The purpose of section
301 is to open markets and eliminate trade-distorting measures. 38 The
government should be free to pursue settlements that optimize the inter-
ests of the United States, even if these settlements compromise an individ-
ual petitioner's interests. No single industry or petitioner should have a
veto over settlements that affect diverse interests throughout the nation.
The conduct of section 301 investigations is governed by the nation's
trade policy interests rather than by the individual interests of a particular
private party. In order to ensure that section 301 investigations will opti-
mize national interests, U.S.T.R. should base its decision to initiate an
investigation on an economic evaluation of the extent to which United
States trade is "burden[ed] or restrict[ed]" by the challenged practices; a
legal evaluation of the arguments that can be raised in international nego-
tiations and dispute settlement procedures; and a political evaluation of an
investigation's likely effect on foreign relations and domestic politics.3 In
devising a negotiable solution, U.S.T.R. should again make all three
evaluations.40
Like claims espoused by the State Department,4' section 301 investiga-
37. See supra note 14.
38. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
39. Currently, U.S.T.R. is given sole authority to decide whether it has a sufficient basis for
initiating an investigation under § 301. See 15 C.F.R. § 2006.0-2006.2 (1986). Petitions are evalu-
ated in terms of the sufficiency of the information provided, as well as the likelihood of success in
international negotiations and the policy implications of initiating or not initiating an investigation.
See Archibald, supra note 33.
40. U.S.T.R. is also given broad discretion over the conduct of § 301 investigations and negotia-
tions. U.S.T.R. is directed to "seek advice" from the petitioner, but must also consult with other
sectors of society. See 19 U.S.C. § 2412(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. 111 1985). U.S.T.R. must solicit written
comments, hold public hearings, and consult with the members of the interagency 301 committee. 19
U.S.C. §§ 2412-13 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Typically, the 301 committee is made up of representa-
tives from the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, and Justice, the Office
of Management and Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers. Archibald, supra note 33.
U.S.T.R. must also request immediate consultations with the foreign government or instrumentality
named in a petition before initiating an investigation. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2412-13 (1982 & Supp. III
1985). If the petition raises issues which are covered by an international legal agreement, section 303
requires U.S.T.R. to follow the dispute settlement procedures of the agreement. Id. Before recom-
mending retaliation, U.S.T.R. is expected to solicit public comments or hold public hearings and to
obtain advice from private sector groups; U.S.T.R. may also request the views of the International
Trade Commission as to the probable impact of the proposed action on the United States economy. 19
U.S.C. § 2414(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
41. The State Department may "espouse" at the diplomatic level claims of United States citizens
who have been harmed by a foreign government. See H. STEINER & D. VAGrs, TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS 246-49 (3d ed. 1986). For example, a United States company that has been expro-
priated by a foreign government may submit its claim for compensation to the State Department. The
State Department, however, has complete discretion over whether to initiate negotiations and how to
conduct those negotiations. The judiciary traditionally invokes the Act of State doctrine to avoid decid-
ing expropriation cases, instead deferring to negotiations by the executive branch. See Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1963), on remand 272 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff d 383
F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967). But see Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Government of Socialist Ethio-
pia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984) (Act of State doctrine not applied to cases where expropriation is
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tions should rest entirely under presidential discretion. Section 301 gives
United States citizens a statutory right to request the United States gov-
ernment to protect their interests when market entry is denied or discour-
aged in a manner that the President considers unreasonable or unjust,42
but forces those citizens to accept their government's judgment regarding
political realities and the current international legal framework. Section
301 provides a mechanism through which a private claim can percolate
into the public sphere; in doing so, however, the claim must lose its indi-
vidual character and become a national claim.
2. Whether and When To Take Action
The broad national interests at stake in section 301 investigations also
counsel against recent legislative proposals seeking to establish tight dead-
lines and mandatory criteria for initiation or retaliation."3 As Justice
Sutherland argued in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,""
"congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotia-
tion and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.' 5
The President must have the discretion to balance the goal of obtaining
relief for a particular group or industry against other goals such as main-
taining positive relations with a given country, preserving a basis for com-
promise in the next round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN),'
alleged to be in violation of treaty between United States and foreign government); see also RESTATE-
MENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986) (final version
forthcoming summer 1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (expropriation must be accompanied by
"just" compensation).
42. Although § 301 is primarily designed to remove barriers to United States exports, it can also
be used to provide import relief. See supra note 24.
43. See supra notes 15-16.
44. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
45. Id. at 320. While there has recently been much concern that too much discretion can result in
unwanted foreign entanglements, complete removal of discretion in international negotiations under
§ 301 could increase, rather than reduce, frictions with foreign governments.
46. The principal international legal agreement governing international trade relations is the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; see J. JACKSON, J.-V. LoUIS & M. MAT-
SUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RULES 141 (1984). GATT, which has 91 members, requires each signatory to treat the
trade of all other signatories equally, prohibits most forms of protection other than customs tariffs,
prohibits export subsidies on manufactured products, and limits the use of export subsidies on pri-
mary products. GATT has resulted in a series of tariff reductions, and gives its signatories the right to
demand compensation if another signatory unilaterally raises its tariffs above negotiated levels. The
current version of GATT is contained in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC
INSTRUMENTS & SELECTED DOCUMENTS (Supps. I-XXX).
GATT has also sponsored seven rounds of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) for the pur-
pose of negotiating reductions in tariff and nontariff barriers to international trade. The last such
round (the "Tokyo Round", 1973-79) resulted in a significant number of multilateral agreements
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and avoiding foreign retaliation against other sectors of the American
economy-especially in sectors where the United States condones practices
similar to those which form the basis of a petition.
Section 301's underlying strategy of negotiation requires an acute sensi-
tivity to the delicate political balances that lie behind the trade practices of
foreign governments. Legislation setting out criteria for mandatory retalia-
tion could very easily make United States trading partners less, not more,
willing to negotiate. The threat of retaliation, not retaliation itself, has
produced results in section 301 negotiations.4 The establishment of un-
realistically short deadlines for mandatory retaliation could undermine ex-
isting procedures for international dispute settlement under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),4' and could also interfere with
flexible consideration of such variables as the timing of the petition, the
state of the President's relations with Congress, and foreign policy devel-
opments. Presidential discretion gives the Administration the flexibility to
act when the timing is right.
The President should have the same type of discretion in administering
section 301 that is afforded the Attorney General in the administration of
domestic laws.4 The executive branch should retain sole discretion over
decisions to initiate and resolve section 301 investigations. Its decisions
should not be subject to challenge by private parties or to detailed statu-
tory requirements. Like the Attorney General, the President must be free
covering nontariff barriers such as customs valuation, discriminatory government procurement, import
licensing, technical standards, domestic subsidies, and antidumping laws. See AGREEMENTS REACHED
IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1979). The agreements were implemented into United States law by the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144. A new round of MTN negotiations (the
"Uruguay Round") was formally launched on September 20, 1986. See GATT Launches Uruguay
Round as Consensus Reached on Services, Agricultral Trade, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1150 (Sept.
24, 1986); Decision To Launch New GATT Round Is Victory for U.S., USTR Yeutter Tells Ways
and Means, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1182 (Oct. 1, 1986).
47. See Hearings, supra note 9, (statement of Allan I. Mendelowitz summarizing results of 1986
General Accounting Office study on the effectiveness of actions under § 301).
48. GATT and the MTN codes negotiated under its auspices set up mechanisms to settle any
disputes that arise under those agreements. See Jackson, GATT as an Instrument for the Settlement
of Trade Disputes, 1967 PRoc. AM. SOc'Y OF IN'L L. 144.
49. The Attorney General, who is entrusted with enforcing the domestic laws written by Con-
gress, is not required to answer to individuals adversely affected by his decisions. He has full discre-
tion to select the cases the Department of Justice will bring. He may seek to expand the law to cover
new situations, and may drop any specific case in favor of another case that may raise certain issues
more sharply. He is also authorized to devise settlements that will advance the public interest without
the expense of litigation. For a general discussion of the constitutional and policy underpinnings of the
Attorney General's prosecutorial discretion in the antitrust area, see Sullivan, Judicial Oversight of
Antitrust Enforcement: Questions of Power; Questions of Wisdom, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 943 (1983);
see also Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1971).
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to consider the vast range of factors which determine whether a given
action under section 301 is actually in the public interest.5"
B. The Case for Structure
1. The Need for Statutory Guidance
Section 301's authorization of action against "unreasonable" foreign
government practices may be the statute's most powerful weapon for
achieving the elimination of "unfair" distortionary commercial policies.
Whereas the statute's three other categories of action51 are limited to en-
forcing existing international legal concepts, the "unreasonable" language
in section 301 involves the negotiation of new international agreements in
unsettled areas of international trade law, and thus the making of new
foreign commercial policy. The "unreasonable" provision has become a
central feature of the Administration's aggressive new policy under section
301,52 and a central focus of recent legislative proposals to amend section
301.5s
Despite the importance of section 301's unreasonableness provision,
Congress has provided the President with no substantive direction for de-
termining which foreign governmental practices should be found "unrea-
sonable." A foreign practice or policy may be deemed "unreasonable"
even if it is consistent with the international rights of the United States, so
long as the President determines that it is "otherwise . . .unfair and in-
equitable."5 4 The standard of fairness and equity places virtually no re-
strictions on what the President may consider "unreasonable," 55 and al-
50. Factors which U.S.T.R. is uniquely competent to evaluate include the likelihood of successful
negotiations, which priorities to emphasize given the limited capacities of the interagency process, and
the limited tolerance of such disputes by the international community.
51. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
52. Of the twelve § 301 investigations initiated since 1984, nine have included claims of "unrea-
sonable" foreign governmental practices. See SEcTION 301 TABLE, supra note 9. All six affirmative
determinations under § 301 include determinations of unreasonableness. Id. While the absence of
statutory definitions prior to 1984 creates some difficulty in classifying pre-1984 § 301 investigations,
see supra note 18, only twelve of the forty-five pre-1984 § 301 investigations appear to fit under the
category of unreasonableness. See SE-TION 301 TABLE, supra. Six pre-1984 investigations included
allegations of unreasonableness in addition to more central allegations of treaty violation. Id.
53. See supra note 17.
54. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
55. The 1984 definitional amendments to the Trade Act of 1974 were intended to clarify the
standards for action under § 301, but unfortunately have failed to do so. In addition to the "fairness
and equity" language, the statute provides only an illustrative list of practices that could come within
the statute, including "any act, policy, or practice which denies fair and equitable-(A) market oppor-
tunities; (B) opportunities for the establishment of an enterprise; or (C) provision of adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights." 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
The standard of unreasonableness originally suggested in the Senate report accompanying the 1974
Trade Act applied to trade practices which are "not necessarily inconsistent with trade agreements,
but which nullify or impair benefits accruing to the United States under trade agreements, or which
otherwise restrict or burden United States commerce." S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 20. This stan-
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lows the President to shape foreign commercial policy independently of
Congress. It also feeds foreign perceptions that United States actions
under the statute are arbitrary unilateral assaults on legitimate govern-
mental policies, increasing the likelihood that actions under the statute
will provoke foreign resistance and counter-retaliation rather than con-
structive negotiations.
This lack of statutory guidance is especially problematic in the context
of "self-initiated" actions under the statute. In contrast with the complex
procedural requirements that must be satisfied in order for private peti-
tions to trigger executive action under the statute, section 301 authorizes
the President to act on his own motion with minimal procedural require-
ments. The statute requires no preliminary period of consultation between
private industry and U.S.T.R.,56 no period of review during which
U.S.T.R. can mediate among conflicting interests, and imposes only a lim-
ited obligation to provide an opportunity for public comments. 57 In fact,
the decision to initiate an investigation may be based almost entirely on
political reasons. 58 Section 301's lack of procedural safeguards for "self-
initiated" investigations thus poses a significant danger that the Adminis-
tration's desire to maximize political mileage may deflect negotiations
away from the economic and legal considerations implicit in section 301.
dard was at once too narrow and too broad. Reference to the GATT concept of "nullification and
impairment" suggested that the provision only applied to practices which clearly conflict with specific
benefits such as tariff concessions, which involve reliance-inducing behavior or "bad faith" motivation.
See generally Hudec, Retaliating Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices, 59 MINN. L.
REv. 461 (1975). Reference to practices which "otherwise restrict or burden United States com-
merce," on the other hand, suggests that the President may retaliate against any foreign trade practice
that in some sense injures United States commerce, even though the practice is legal under interna-
tional law. Id.
The 1984 language of "fairness and equity" implies a congressional rejection of the narrower read-
ing of "unreasonable," but gives little guidance as to how broadly that language may be read. Actions
that are specifically authorized under a trade agreement to which the United States is a party are
considered per se reasonable. See Archibald, supra note 33 (citing the President's determination re-
garding Japanese quotas on leather imports, 45 Fed. Reg. 51,171 (1980)). But see Japan Tobacco
Products, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,689 (1985) (Off. U.S. Trade Rep. initiation), 51 Fed. Reg. 35,995 (1986)
(Off. U.S. Trade Rep. termination). Aside from this general rule, however, there has been little effort
to give substantive legal content to the concept of unreasonableness in international trade.
56. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (U.S.T.R. required only to consult with Section
301 Committee before deciding to "self-initiate" an investigation, and to publish notice of its decision
in Federal Register).
57. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (President required to "provide an opportu-
nity for the presentation of views" before taking action on his own motion, but allowed to waive this
requirement if "he determines that expeditious action is required"). Cf supra note 40.
58. For example, the first four cases initiated by U.S.T.R. on its own motion, see supra note 11,
were clearly intended to deflect attention away from protectionist measures. See Cooper & Stokes,
Buying Time on Trade, NAT'L J., Nov. 9, 1985, at 2524, 2528; Koh, supra note 3, at 1221-25. They
appear to have been chosen partly on the basis of their targets-South Korea and Japan are among
the most frequent targets of protectionist legislation-and partly because they addressed congressional
concern with "new" trade issues (protection of intellectual property and barriers to investment) that
were specifically singled out in the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (e)(3)-(4) (1982
& Supp. III 1985).
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2. Advantages of a Standard
Although the President should retain ultimate discretion over his deci-
sions under section 301, Congress should not hesitate to exercise its consti-
tutional authority to define statutorily the way in which the President
should use the tools provided by section 301 .5 In order to increase the
effectiveness of section 301, Congress can and should amend the statute to
include an explicit legal standard for determining when a foreign practice
is sufficiently "unreasonable" to justify initiating a section 301
investigation.
Like judicial standards defining "reasonableness" in other contexts,60 a
statutory standard would guide Presidential action, apprise concerned par-
ties of their rights, and facilitate enforcement of these rights. A clearly
enunciated domestic legal standard of unreasonableness would make it
more difficult for political considerations to dominate the economic and
legal goals against which those political considerations must be balanced.
The standard would also allow Congress to retain greater control over the
development of new foreign commercial policy. Finally, the standard
would enhance the President's negotiating position at the international
level, increasing the likelihood of successful settlements and decreasing the
likelihood that the President will be forced to resort to costly retaliation.
The increased use and visibility of section 301 pose a significant danger
that political considerations may dominate the economic and legal aspects
of the investigatory process and dictate the outcome of particular cases,
particularly when such cases are "self-initiated." 1 The President's broad
discretion allows him to make policy decisions without the safeguards of
administrative rulemaking proceedings or the careful appellate review of a
court. While Presidential discretion should not be eliminated, a statutory
standard would at least provide explicit criteria for judging Presidential
action, and place upon the President the burden of explaining his actions
when they deviate from that standard. A statutory standard would also
allow Congress to state its policy goals and exert greater influence over
agreements negotiated under the "unreasonable" provision.
Finally, an amendment giving greater legal content to the concept of
59. See Koh, supra note 3 (discussing history and constitutional limits of congressional ability to
limit President's negotiating authority).
60. The Fourth Amendment, for example, protects United States residents from "unreasonable"
search and seizure. The executive branch is not, however, left free to determine "reasonableness" on
its own. It must generally obtain a court warrant certifying the reasonableness of a particular search,
or demonstrate circumstances which render the warrantless search reasonable. See, e.g., Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978) (holding that reasonableness of warrantless search depends
on "specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees" of statute being enforced). Similarly, § 301's
use of the term "unreasonable" clearly mandates that the executive should undertake a balancing of
federal interests against the need for adequate notice and consistent application.
61. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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unreasonableness in international trade would make section 301 a more
effective negotiating tool and further the provision's goal of expanding in-
ternational legal agreement to new areas of international trade. A clear
statement of the direction of United States trade policy would advance the
current international dialogue on trade law, and would allow the Presi-
dent to guide his actions in a way that will most effectively use the statute
in the service of consistent trade policy goals. The standard would also
allow foreign governments to structure their commercial policies in ways
calculated to avoid triggering United States action under section 301. To
the extent that a standard of unreasonableness incorporates international
legal norms,62 it will reduce the sting of unilateral action under section
301, reducing the likelihood of retaliation and increasing the potential for
constructive negotiations.63
IV. DEFINING UNREASONABLENESS
Current legislative proposals to structure section 301's provision against
"unreasonable" foreign practices simply make ad hoc additions to the stat-
ute's illustrative list of "unreasonable" practices.6 4 In order to ensure that
executive action under section 301 is consistent with the statute's underly-
ing goals, Congress should instead enact a statutory amendment that rein-
forces the statute's economic and legal objectives. The amendment should
define as "unreasonable" those foreign practices that: (1) distort patterns
of comparative advantage; and (2) contradict legal criteria for "reasona-
ble" exercises of international jurisdiction. Political considerations should
not enter the decisionmaking process until each of these requirements has
been met.
A. Economic Requirements: Distortion of Comparative Advantage
In the field of international trade, the economic elements of unreasona-
bleness should be evaluated in terms of the theory of comparative advan-
tage, which holds that all countries benefit if each country specializes in
producing the goods in which it is relatively more efficient. 5 If 1 unit of
labor produces 15 tons of wheat in country A and only 10 tons of wheat
62. See infra Section IV.B.
63. Faced with the equally broad language of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), and the
Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), the Department of Justice Antitrust Division
published guidelines disclosing how it will decide whether or not to challenge a merger. While similar
guidelines setting out U.S.T.R.'s criteria for unreasonableness would also impose greater discipline
and integrity on the use of § 301, congressional dissatisfaction with the Administration's performance
under § 301 suggests that a statutory amendment is more likely to serve Congress's aim of ensuring
active use of the § 301 program.
64. See supra note 17.
65. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMicS 832-40 (12th ed. 1985).
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in country B, but produces 20 tons of steel in both countries, country A
should specialize in wheat and country B should specialize in steel. If
country A adopts a policy which causes it to produce more steel than it
would without the policy, both countries will be worse off, because there
will be less goods to trade.
The theory of comparative advantage suggests that the first test of un-
reasonableness should examine whether a foreign government practice en-
courages global inefficiency by denying access to goods and services that
could in fact be provided more cheaply and efficiently by American
firms."6 This theory has been incorporated in other areas of United States
trade law,6 7 which implicitly assume that American firms are entitled to
the market outcome that would result from a relatively "fair" and undis-
torted competitive process."8 Like these other areas of United States trade
law, section 301 should seek to neutralize the external effects of trade-
distorting foreign practices or policies. The statute should be used to nego-
tiate "fair" international legal agreements .reducing the trade-distorting
impact of domestic policies that are not currently regulated by interna-
tional law.69
While this test advances the United States' economic interest in promot-
ing its exports, it also poses two significant problems. First, short-term
66. In this respect, § 301 is supplementary to United States antidumping (AD) and counter-
vailing duty (CVD) laws. See supra note 7.
67. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, for example, authorizes the imposition of a counter-
vailing duty equal to any "net subsidy" provided by the country of origin "with respect to .. .
manufacture, production or exportation" of the goods. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671-1677(g) (1982).
Similarly, antidumping law imposes duties to offset sales at "less than fair value." See 19 U.S.C. §§
1673-1677(g) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of
International Trade, 100 HARe. L. REv. 546, 549-50 (1987) (characterizing antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty laws as "market-corrective," but arguing that market ideal cannot be fully imple-
mented by such laws). Similar rules prevail in other countries as well. See, e.g., Sherliker, The An-
tidumping and Anti-Subsidy Regime in the EEC, 4 THE COMPANY LAW. 25, 26 (1983); see also
Agreement on Interpretation of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the GATT ("Subsidies Code"), Apr.
12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, implemented into United States law by the Trade Act of
1979, 93 Stat. 144, 147-48, 150-93 (Signatories agree to "seek to avoid . . . adversely affectling] the
conditions of normal competition.").
68. For further discussion of the "entitlement" rationale, see Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, The
Meaning of "Subsidy" and "Injury" in the Countervailing Duty Law, 6 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 17,
18 (1986).
69. The principal international legal agreements governing international trade, GATT and the
MTN codes negotiated pursuant to GATT, contain no provisions dealing with two primary areas of
Congressional concern: trade in services and international investment. In addition, they contain very
little guidance regarding domestic economic policies which distort trade but make no distinction as to
the origin or destination of goods. See generally F. ROESSLER, THE SCOPE, LIMrrs AND FUNCTON
OF THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 1, 6-7 (n.d.; available from GATT Secretariat, Geneva, Switzerland)
(arguing that GATT action in this regard has largely been limited to establishment of rules governing
countervailing duties to offset production subsidies abroad, and compensation due to a signatory party
that has lost commercial benefit of a tariff concession as result of another party's domestic policy
measures). The new Uruguay Round, however, may address many of these issues. See General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade: Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 26 I.L.M. 1623 (1986).
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distortions of comparative advantage may in fact be efficiency-enhancing
in the longer term."' GATT, for example, includes a limited exception
allowing governments to undertake policies which encourage the develop-
ment of inefficient "infant" industries.' This exception allows govern-
ments to compensate new firms for the external economies involved in
developing new areas of efficiency, and permits nations to change their
areas of comparative advantage over time.
Second, economic efficiency is not the only goal that may legitimately be
pursued by sovereign nations. If there is a demand for certain other social
values, governmental action which gives effect to such demands is ulti-
mately efficiency-enhancing. For reasons of social preference, a nation
may want to keep a certain portion of the population engaged in tradi-
tional sectors, even if pure private competition would result in a smaller
number of persons remaining in such activities.7 1 Similarly, it may be
thought desirable to maintain a level of domestic production that would
assure self-sufficiency and independence from foreign suppliers."3 As one
pair of critics has pointed out: "These [goals] ...can be deplored as
misguided by those who disagree with them, but there is no way in princi-
ple to reject them as less legitimate than others . . . .
70. The eventual gains from establishing a new industry cannot always be recouped by those who
make the initial investments in the industry. For example, if labor skills are transferrable to other
industries, a firm may not obtain full return on its investment in training its workers. Tariff protec-
tion is one way of compensating businesses for these external economies. See R. CAVES & R. JONES,
WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS 223-24 (1981).
Market distortions can produce efficient results even in the short run, if there are short-run exter-
nalities (such as the dissemination of useful technical information to other firms), public goods by-
products (such as alleviation of regional disparities), or if the industry is suffering negative effects
from other kinds of legislation. See Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, supra note 68, at 17-18.
71. GATT article XVIII provides that developing countries may impose quantitative restrictions
that are "required to promote the establishment of a particular industry with a view to raising the
general standard of living of its people" provided that "no measure consistent with other provisions of
this Agreement is practicable to achieve that objective." GATT, supra note 46, art. XVIII, paras. 2,
3, 7, 13, 22 & annex I. GATT article XVIII also permits import restrictions to be imposed by
developing countries where such restrictions are "necessary" to "forestall the threat of, or to stop,
serious decline in monetary reserves" or "to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in [inadequate]
reserves." Id. at para. 9.
72. Free trade typically hurts groups that stand to lose their jobs or market share to more efficient
foreign competition. Optimally, the best solution to this problem is to design a policy that will com-
pensate these groups for their losses: the gains from trade (access to a wider range of goods and
services; more efficient reallocation of productive resources; lower consumer prices) should be large
enough to fully compensate for any such losses. See R. CAVES & R. JONES, supra note 70, at 27.
Strong political support for protectionism is often attributed to the disproportionate political influ-
ence of producer interests. People earn their income in one area, but spend it in many; thus, people
are more likely to allocate their resources to influencing policies affecting them in their role as in-
come-receivers. See F. ROESSLER, supra note 69, at 13-14. On the other hand, a society that is fully
informed of the costs of protection might still wish to preserve forms of traditional activity such as an
agricultural way of life, even at an economically inefficient cost. See Schwartz & Harper, The Regula-
tion of Subsidies Affecting International Trade, 70 MicH. L. REV. 831, 846 (1972).
73. See, e.g., GATT, supra note 46, art. XXI (establishing national security exception).
74. Schwartz & Harper, supra note 72, at 846.
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The entitlement of private firms to an undistorted market outcome may
thus be counterbalanced by a parallel entitlement on the part of rival
firms to the benefits of domestic policies that pursue public goals other
than economic efficiency.75 While the comparative advantage test may ad-
vance the United States' interest in promoting free trade, it does not ad-
dress the question of whether the United States can raise section 301 chal-
lenges to the trade-distorting practices or policies of a foreign sovereign in
a manner consistent with international law. That question can only be
answered by looking at current international legal norms and customs re-
garding the proper way to balance global economic efficiency against con-
flicting national goals.76
B. Legal Requirements: Reasonable Exercise of Jurisdiction
An effective legal standard for judging unreasonableness in the area of
international trade must defer to the legitimate political and economic
goals of independent national sovereigns. 7 The standard should establish
a narrow goal and sense of discipline in a process that might otherwise
produce a spiral of expanding political demands.7 8 In order to ease the
tension created by a unilateral assault on foreign trade policies and to
decrease the dangers involved in initiating a section 301 investigation, the
standard should incorporate international legal norms and customs.7 9
Section 403 of the draft Restatement of Foreign Relations Law8" lists
75. See Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, supra note 68, at 19.
76. While there is no single mechanism for enforcing international law, four generally accepted
sources of law govern international disputes: international conventions expressly recognized by the
disputing parties; international custom, "as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;" the "gen-
eral principles of law recognized by civilized nations;" and, as a subsidiary means, the "teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations." STATUTE OF THE INT'L COURT OF JUs-
TICE, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (1945); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 102. See
generally L. HENKIN, R. PUGH & 0. SCHACTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS
35-136 (2d ed. 1987).
77. The doctrines of nonintervention and of the equality of national sovereigns support the right
of independent nation-states to decide matters essentially within their domestic jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
78. Politics enters the § 301 process through the network of interagency committees that works
with U.S.T.R. to make decisions under the statute. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Each
agency in this process represents different interests: foreign policy concerns (Department of State);
trade policy concerns (Department of Commerce); domestic economic concerns (Office of Management
and Budget, Council of Economic Advisers, Department of the Treasury); and other domestic policy
concerns (Department of Agriculture, Department of Labor). The ensuing process of interagency
bargaining creates a danger that negotiating demands will "spiral," seeking to solve domestic problems
unrelated to the issue of the unreasonableness of a given foreign practice. For a general discussion of
the role of domestic politics in international trade policy, see Destler, United States Trade Policymak-
ing During the Tokyo Round, in THE POLITICS OF TRADE: UNITED STATES AND JAPANESE POLI-
CYMAKING FOR THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS 16-19, 23-24 (M. Blaker ed. 1978).
79. Incorporation of international legal norms is also consistent with § 301's general legislative
intent to respect international law. See supra notes 23-29.
80. RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 403 (a)-(h).
1139
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 96: 1122, 1987
eight factors to be considered in determining whether a nation's exercise
of jurisdiction is "unreasonable." ' Although these factors are primarily
intended to define the permissible scope of a nation's exercise of prescrip-
tive jurisdiction,8 2 this Note suggests that they can also be used to delimit
the permissible scope of a nation's challenges of foreign practices. Any
country should have the right to challenge a foreign policy that is imple-
mented in a manner that is an "unreasonable" exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction, so long as negotiations are limited to seeking modifications in
foreign regulations or practices to eliminate their "unreasonable" external
effects. Section 301 can be viewed as merely establishing the domestic stat-
utory framework through which the United States will exercise this inter-
national legal right.
The eight Restatement factors suggest that a nation has exercised "un-
reasonable" jurisdiction if (1) its practice or policy has "substantial, direct
and foreseeable" external effects harming United States citizens or United
States policies;"3 and (2) the practice violates or threatens the international
81. The eight factors are:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state or (ii) has
substantial, direct and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating state;
(b) the connections between the regulating state and the persons principally . . . [affected
by] the law or regulation ...;
(c) . . .the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation in
question;
(e) the importance of the regulation in question to the international political, legal or eco-
nomic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international
system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
Id.
82. Section 403 sets forth limitations on a nation-state's exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe law.
Nation-states may claim either prescriptive jurisdiction (the right to project policies regulating actors
and activities), jurisdiction to adjudicate, or jurisdiction to enforce. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 41,
§ 401; see also Laker Airways v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 921-22 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (summarizing bases of concurrent prescriptive jurisdiction); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F. 2d 597, 608-15 (9th Cir. 1976) (summarizing principles used
in determining extraterritorial jurisdiction under U.S. antitrust laws).
83. At least two of the factors listed in § 403 emphasize the effects of an activity as a basis for
asserting prescriptive jurisdiction: there must be "substantial, direct and foreseeable" effects in the
state asserting jurisdiction (factor a), and strong connections to the principal affected parties (factor b).
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 403. Section 403 also suggests a balancing of an activity's inter-
nal effects against its external effects. Factors a and b emphasize internal effects. Factors g and h, on
the other hand, emphasize the "extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity" and the "likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states." Id. In addition, factor c takes
into account the "importance of the regulation to the regulating state." Id.
Some United States courts have adopted a similar "balancing" approach to determine whether they
can appropriately assert prescriptive jurisdiction. See, e.g., Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614 (plaintiff
alleged conspiracy in both United States and Honduras to drive plaintiff's Honduran subsidiaries out
of business of exporting lumber to United States). This approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction has
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legal, political, or economic system."4 Thus, in addition to demonstrating a
substantial impact on American interests, U.S.T.R. must be able to argue
that a challenged practice significantly departs from either the interna-
tional agreements or accepted practices of countries with similar economic
systems and at similar levels of economic development."5 Even hortatory
international agreements, which are not legally binding, can be used to
demonstrate an emerging international legal principle and to support
"justified expectations" on the part of American firms.88
In cases in which U.S.T.R. can establish the unreasonableness of a for-
eign trade practice by demonstrating both substantial external effects and
significant departure from international legal norms, the United States
should have the right to negotiate changes in a foreign practice to mini-
mize its harmful external effects. While an activity's internal effects in a
foreign country may justify that country's initial assertion of jurisdiction
been heavily criticized as requiring courts to weigh sensitive political and diplomatic concerns that are
traditionally considered nonjusticiable. See, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 949-50 (affirming court
order restraining defendants from seeking in English courts an injunction against plaintiff's United
States antitrust suit); Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial Application of United
States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1693, 1699-1706 (1985) (criticizing interest-based approach to
extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust law and proposing alternative approach based on forum non
conveniens). While it may be inappropriate for domestic courts to base their assertions of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction on their own "balancing" of the domestic and foreign interests involved, this Note
argues that such balancing is appropriate for the political branches of government when determining
whether it is appropriate to assert a right to influence the implementation of a foreign regulation. The
executive branch is better equipped than the judiciary to procure necessary information and to make
judgments regarding political, social, and economic conditions. Moreover, the role of national bias is
reduced in the context of bilateral negotiations.
84. The final factors weighed by § 403 are "the extent to which other states regulate such activi-
ties and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted" (factor c); the
"'existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation" (factor d); the
importance of the regulation "to the international political, legal or economic system" (factor e); and
the "extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system"
(factor f. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 403. Practices or regulations that are widespread in
the international community create "customary international law," and must be respected in order to
preserve predictability in international relations. See supra note 76; infra note 85. On the other hand,
practices that diverge greatly from accepted practices or principles do not enjoy a presumption of
"reasonableness." If these practices threaten the predictability of international relations ("justified
expectations"), or undermine established international institutions (such as the GATT), they may
well be "unreasonable" and subject to challenge under § 301.
85. Whether a customary norm of international law practiced by a large number of states is
binding on all other states is a matter of debate. See Tunkin, Remarks on the Juridical Nature of
Customary Norms of International Law, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 419, 426-29 (1961). However, to the
extent that nations with similar problems and similar social systems do adhere to a norm, a foreign
government will find it more difficult to justify a deviant policy with harmful external effects.
86. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, §403(d). These agreements, while not binding, lend
broader international legal support to unilateral United States actions under § 301. Reliance on such
agreements allows the United States to strike a balance between the goal of establishing agreements
that go beyond existing international law, see supra note 27 and accompanying text, and the need to
respect the international legal principles of national sovereignty and noninterference, see supra notes
76-77 and accompanying text; see also Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 18, at 577-78 (arguing that
right protected by § 301 is combination of national and international norms, and listing various non-
binding international agreements that could form basis of § 301 petitions).
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to regulate that activity,8 the activity's external effects on the United
States can also justify the United States' assertion of a right to influence
that regulation through international negotiations. Thus, section 301 does
not directly involve assertion of United States jurisdiction; instead, it re-
flects the United States' assertion of a right to influence "unreasonable"
exercises of foreign jurisdiction through negotiated settlements.88 U.S.T.R.
should give proper deference to the policy objectives of foreign govern-
ments and limit its negotiating objectives to obtaining changes that will
significantly reduce the "unreasonable" external effects of a challenged
practice.
C. Applying the Standard: Recent Cases
Analysis of the complex right established by section 301 suggests that
investigations of "unreasonable" foreign government practices under sec-
tion 301 should be evaluated under a two-part test that examines (1)
whether the challenged practice distorts comparative advantage, and (2)
whether the practice creates both a substantial effect on the United States
economy and a significant departure from international legal norms. This
two-part test can be used to evaluate two interpretations of unreasonable-
ness that have emerged in recent section 301 investigations. The first in-
terpretation, adopted by the petition of the Semiconductor Industry Asso-
ciation (SIA) in Japan Semiconductors,89 measures unreasonableness in
terms of "reciprocity" 90 in market shares. The second interpretation,
adopted in the government's investigation of Korea Intellectual Prop-
erty,91 seeks "reciprocity" in the context of international legal norms. Ap-
plication of the two-part standard to each of these cases shows that only
the latter meets the economic and legal requirements of unreasonableness
under section 301.
1. Japan Semiconductors: "Reciprocity" Measured by Market Shares
The Japan Semiconductors petition argued that Japanese government
policies that encouraged specialization and cooperation among domestic
87. See supra note 83.
88. Assertions of jurisdiction are implicated under section 301 only indirectly, as a measure of the
unreasonableness of a challenged foreign trade practice.
89. Japan Semiconductors, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,866 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep. 1985) (initiation), 51 Fed.
Reg. 27,811 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep. 1986) (suspension).
90. The concept of "reciprocity" is a recurring theme of proposed trade legislation. See, e.g.,
§ 105(b) of S. 490, 132 CONG. REC. S1853 (1987) (negotiations should seek "competitive opportuni-
ties for United States exports in foreign markets equivalent to the competitive opportunities afforded
foreign exports in United States markets). "Reciprocity" is also expected to be featured in President
Reagan's trade bill. See Pine, supra note 13.
91. Korea Intellectual Property, 50 Fed. Reg. 45,883 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep. 1985) (initiation), 51
Fed. Reg. 29,445 (Presidential Memorandum 1986) (terminating investigation).
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producers and pressured Japanese semiconductor consumers to "buy Jap-
anese," have created a market structure that unreasonably restricts the
sale of American-made semiconductors in Japan.92 SIA based its claim of
unreasonableness on the alleged lack of "reciprocity" evinced by the dis-
parity between the share of the Japanese market held by American semi-
conductor manufacturers and the share of the United States market en-
joyed by Japanese manufacturers."
This measure of unreasonableness fails each of the two prongs of the
unreasonableness standard outlined above. First, SIA's petition failed to
show that the inability of United States exporters to obtain reciprocal
market shares directly resulted from trade-distorting Japanese policies. In
fact, the poor performance of SIA companies was largely caused by differ-
ences in productive efficiency 94 and product quality,"' by the competitive
impact of misalignments or fluctuations of currency exchange rates,98 or
by differences in specialization and consumption patterns in the two mar-
kets.917 Second, the SIA petition failed to show that Japanese policies di-
rectly created "substantial effects" on the United States economy, or that
these policies significantly departed from any international legal norm.98
SIA's failure to understand the economic and legal dimensions of un-
reasonableness under section 301 is demonstrated by its proposed remedy:
a guaranteed share of the Japanese market for United States manufactur-
92. See Japanese Market Barriers in Microelectronics, Memorandum in Support of the Semicon-
ductor Industry Association's Petition Pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (June 14,
1985) (available in U.S.T.R. public file, docket no. 301-48) [hereinafter Japanese Market Barriers in
Microelectronics]. Prior to 1975, the Japanese government formally protected the semiconductor in-
dustry by imposing restrictions on foreign imports of integrated circuits for computers and on foreign
investment in Japanese companies that produce integrated circuits. Id. at 12 & n.19. Although these
restrictions were officially lifted in 1975, SIA argued in its petition that the Japanese government then
instituted a series of "counter-measures" which undermined this liberalization. Id. at 17.
93. Id. at 92-99.
94. See Foreign Goods Made at Home, EcoNoMisT, July 6, 1985, at 65.
95. Differences in product quality and services between United States and Japanese firms have
been well-documented. See, e.g., D. Sanger, Pentagon Study Urges U.S. Aid for Embattled Chip
Industry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1987, at Al, col. 1; RAM Parts We Watch Are Better from Japan,
ELECTRONICS, Mar. 8, 1984; Why U.S. Chips Don't Sell in Japan, San Jose Mercury News, July
29, 1985, at 01, 04.
96. The high value of the dollar relative to the yen has also created difficulties for United States
exports. See generally Kubarych, Trade Policy and the Dollar, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL 1100
(1986).
97. In its reply brief to the SIA petition, the Electronics Industry Association of Japan argued
that "U.S. companies do not emphasize the types of semiconductors most in demand in Japan,
namely, those used in consumer products." Brief of the Electronics Industry Association of Japan at 2
(Aug. 26, 1985) (available in U.S.T.R. public file, docket no. 301-48). While consumer electronic
products accounted for 47% of the Japanese semiconductor market in 1984, they accounted for only
8% of end-uses in the United States. Id.
98. SIA's allegations of Japanese dumping violations were filed separately from their section 301
petition. While SIA also argued that Japan's semiconductor policies were "unreasonable" because
they established a market structure that allegedly violated United States antitrust laws, Japanese
Market Barriers in Microelectronics, supra note 92, at 94-98, international comity requires nations
to respect diversity in each other's domestic laws. See supra note 73.
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ers.9" Far from advancing the multiple goals of section 301, the resolution
of Japan Semiconductors created both a distortion of trade and a possible
violation of international legal norms.100 SIA's petition failed to meet the
economic and legal prongs of the unreasonableness standard, and should
not have been accepted by U.S.T.R.
2. Korea Intellectual Property: "Reciprocity" in the Context of Inter-
national Law
The Korea Intellectual Property investigation, self-initiated by
U.S.T.R. in November 1985, sought to change South Korean copyright
and patent laws, which allegedly restricted American sales and investment
in South Korea by denying effective protection to the intellectual property
of United States firms.10 '
The Korea Intellectual Property case, unlike Japan Semiconductors,
meets both the test of trade distortion and the test of legal unreasonable-
ness. South Korea's intellectual property laws skew the relationship be-
tween price and cost by forcing firms to forego compensation for the full
costs of their research and development. Lack of compensation distorts
patterns of trade, discouraging foreign sales and focusing indigenous re-
search and development on inventing new processes for producing old
products, rather than on inventing new products.
Korea Intellectual Property also involved an "unreasonable" exercise of
jurisdiction. While the implementation and enforcement of domestic intel-
lectual property law is a matter of domestic jurisdiction, South Korea's
laws were implemented in a manner that unreasonably affected outside
interests. Intellectual property regulation has a "substantial, direct, and
99. See Japanese Market Barriers in Microelectronics, supra note 92, at 99-101.
100. The United States and Japan reached a vaguely worded agreement in which the United
States agreed to suspend its section 301 and anti-dumping investigations of the Japanese semiconduc-
tor industry, and Japan agreed to increase market access and eliminate dumping. See Japan-United
States: Agreement on Semi-Conductor Trade, 26 I.L.M. 1409 (1986) (text of agreement); Japan
Semiconductors, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,811 (1986) (notice of suspension). The Japanese Government prom-
ised to encourage Japanese producers and users of chips to take advantage of the increased availab-
lility of foreign-made products in their market; to establish an organization to help foreign producers
to increase sales in Japan and to promote joint product development between Japanese semiconductor
purchasers and foreign manufacturers. Id. In February, the Japanese government asked Japanese
semiconductor makers to cut their chip production by 10%. See Japan Asks 10% Cut in Chip Output,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1987, at Dl, col. 3. The EC has called for formal consultations within the
GATT, claiming that the agreement will result in arbitrary increases in the price of semiconductors
on the EC market and will result in privileged access to the Japanese market for United States firms.
See 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1244 (Oct. 15, 1986).
101. See Korea Intellectual Property, supra note 91. South Korea's copyright law, which only
protects works first published in Korea, allows the works of American authors and computer software
designers to be copied and sold in Korea without payment of royalties or license fees. Id. South
Korean patent law also expressly excludes from patentability inventions concerning foods, beverages,
medicines and chemical substances, and extends most patents only to methods of manufacture rather
than to end products. Id.
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foreseeable" effect on American authors and inventors.10 2 Moreover,
South Korean intellectual property laws were inconsistent with emerging
international legal norms. American companies have "justified expecta-
tions" that their intellectual property will not be appropriated without
any compensation, since such expropriation is inconsistent with the "tra-
ditions of the international system."10' International agreements such as
the Universal Copyright Convention10' are more specific symptoms of a
growing international consensus that intellectual property is property, and
as such, entitles its owners to some form of compensation. Although South
Korea is not a signatory to any of these conventions, it was "unreasona-
ble" for the government to continue holding out from this consensus.10 5 A
major trade partner 0" cannot ignore widely-accepted international legal
rules without threatening the international trading system.107
V. CONCLUSION
Implementation of section 301 must be premised on a clear understand-
ing of the international legal right that is protected by the statute. Current
proposals to amend section 301 fail to recognize the complex nature of this
right. In order to preserve the statute's economic, legal, and political
objectives, Congress should reject current legislative proposals that seek to
102. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 403.
103. Id.; see, e.g., Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 29
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975). The Charter recognizes a right to
expropriate foreign property and a concomitant obligation to pay "appropriate compensation ...
provided that all relevant circumstances call for it." Id. at ch. II, art. 2(c); see also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 41, § 712.
104. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, Geneva, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324,
216 U.N.T.S. 132, reoised July 24, 1971, Paris, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868; see also Conven-
tion for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication, Oct. 29, 1971,
26 U.S.T. 309, T.I.A.S. 7808. See generally J. PHILLIPS, INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY LAW 290-97 (1986).
105. See Tunkin, supra note 85 (discussing whether customary international law practiced by
large number of states is binding on other states).
106. For example, South Korean imports from the Western industrialized countries (United
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Western Europe) rose from $14,724 million in
1979 to £19,424 million in 1985; during the same period, South Korean exports to these countries
rose from $11,052 million to $20,243 million. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIRECTION OF
TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK 248-50 (1986).
107. This argument presents an alternative interpretation of the concept of "reciprocity" advanced
in the Japan Semiconductors petition, supra note 89. When deviation from an emerging international
legal norm has substantial external effects, it is "reasonable" to require third countries to accede to the
rules of international trade accepted by other major trading partners. This interpretation of "reciproc-
ity" avoids the problems inherent in using "reciprocity" as a basis for requesting equivalent market
shares or equivalent market rules. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
In July of 1986, the Korean government agreed to present comprehensive copyright bills to the
National Assembly; to take steps to join the Universal Copyright Convention and the Geneva Phono-
grams Convention in 1987; and to present the legislature with a bill to amend the patent law that will
reportedly provide coverage for chemical and pharmaceutical products. See Presidential Memoran-
dum, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,445 (1986). The United States and Korean government each agreed to establish
consultative mechanisms to discuss matters covered under the agreements. Id.
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expand the rights of private petitioners, mandate a minimum number of
actions under the statute, or make ad hoc additions to a list of practices
that are to be considered "unreasonable." ' 08 Instead, Congress should
restructure Presidential discretion in a manner that reinforces the statute's
economic and legal objectives. Congress should enact a statutory amend-
ment defining as "unreasonable" any foreign government practice that (1)
creates clear economic distortions, and (2) produces substantial adverse
effects on the United' States economy in a manner that violates emerging
international legal norms. Enactment of this two-pronged standard would
increase the effectiveness of section 301 and ensure a proper balancing of
the statute's underlying economic, legal or political goals.
108. As this issue goes to press, the House Ways and Means Committee has just passed a trade
bill that significantly softens prior proposals to reduce Presidential discretion. See J. Fuerbringer,
Trade Bill Passed by House Unit, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1987, at DI, col. 6. Like the Bentsen bill,
discussed supra notes 13-17, the House bill would preserve Presidential discretion to forego retalia-
tory action if the President certifies to Congress that retaliation is not in the national economic inter-
est. Both bills, however, contain provisions for mandatory retaliation that would unduly hamper the
President's ability to consider legal and political factors when deciding whether and when to retaliate.
In addition, neither bill makes any attempt to incorporate international legal norms into a definition
of unreasonableness.
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